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The case concerns a request for a preliminary ruling on whether 
European Union (EU) Directives 96/34 and 2006/54 must be 
interpreted as precluding certain national provisions. These 
provisions stipulate that a civil servant is not entitled to parental 
leave in a situation where his wife does not work or exercise any 
profession, unless it is considered that due to a serious illness or 
injury the wife is unable to meet the needs related to the upbringing 
of the child. The Court of Justice of the EU ruled that national 
legislation that deprives a male civil servant of the right to parental 
leave on the ground that his wife does not work or exercise any 
profession is contrary to EU law on parental leave and amounts to 
direct discrimination on grounds of sex. 
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In this case, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) was asked to consider whether provisions of the 
Greek Civil Service Code and the Code of the Status of Judges that restricts access to parental leave 
for fathers in circumstances where the mother of the child was working or was incapacitated by 
illness or serious injury, were precluded by EU law relating to parental leave, specifically Directives 
96/34/EC1 and 2006/54/EC.2 
Mr. Maïstrellis, a Greek judge, applied for nine months of paid parental leave following the birth of 
his child. His application was rejected by the Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon 
Dikaiomaton (minister of justice), on the grounds that the Code on the Status of Judges provides that 
such leave is available for only female judges. Mr. Maïstrellis successfully appealed that decision 
before the Council of State, which ruled that in light of Directive 96/34/EC the Code must apply to 
fathers as well as mothers who serve as judges. The matter was referred back to the minister of 
justice, who rejected Mr. Maïstrellis’s application on the grounds that Article 53(3) of the Civil 
Service Code restricted fathers’ leave to those whose wives worked, thus precluding Mr. Maïstrellis, 
whose wife did not work. In a subsequent appeal against that decision, the Council of State followed 
case law and found that areas not specifically regulated for judges are subject to the Civil Service 
Code. The Greek court questioned the Code’s compliance with Directive 96/34, as amended by 
Council Directive 97/75/EC of 15 December 1997, and Directive 2006/54/EC and, consequently, 
referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. In its reference, the 
Greek Court asked whether the provisions of the directives must be interpreted as precluding 
national regulations such as those contained in Article 53(3) of the Civil Service Code. 
CJEU Judgment 
The CJEU held that such a provision was incompatible with EU law, specifically Directives 96/34, 
97/75 and 2006/54. It opined that, under the provision of clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of the Framework 
Agreement, parental leave is an individual, nontransferable right granted to men and women 
workers to enable them to take care of a child. The Court noted that the Parental Leave Directive’s 
minimum provision of three months of such leave cannot be the subject of derogation by the 
member states by legislation or collective agreements. Furthermore, in accordance with the opinion 
of Advocate General Kokott, the CJEU found that the detailed rules contained in the Directive and 
Framework Agreement did not “in any way provide that one of the parents can be denied the right 
to parental leave … because of the employment status of his or her spouse.”3  
In support of its interpretation of Directive 96/34 as being designed to “facilitate the reconciliation 
of parental and professional responsibilities for working parents,”4 the Court drew on several 
sources, including the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, its earlier 
judgment in Chatzi5 and Article 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides that:  
2. To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to protection from 
dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to 
parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child.   
Turning to consider the principle of equality under Directive 2006/54, the Greek Court invoked the 
prohibition of direct discrimination provided by Article 2(1)(a), finding that “the situation of a male 
employee parent and that of a female employee parent are comparable as regards the bringing-up 
                                                          
1 Of 3 June 1996, on the Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ 
L 145/4. 
2 Of 5 July 2006, on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men 
and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204/23. 
3 Judgment, para 36. 
4 Ibid., para 38. 
5 Case No. C-149/10 Chatzi [2010] ECR I-8489. 
of children.”6 Consequently, the Greek Civil Service Code’s denial of parental leave to a father whose 
spouse does not work or is unable to meet the needs of the child due to serious illness or injury 
could not be upheld because, under national law, “mothers who are civil servants are always 
entitled to parental leave.”7 The Court also found the Greek rule in question to be contrary to the 
provision of Article 3 of Directive 2006/54 because it was “liable to perpetuate a traditional 
distribution of the roles of men and women by keeping men in a subsidiary role to that of women in 
relation to the exercise of their parental duties.”8   
Analysis  
In confirming the extent of the protection of parental leave, this case illustrates the growing 
importance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) to EU equality law. Article 33(2) CFR, despite 
being somewhat anodyne in its written form, is beginning to pack a punch in being used to achieve 
the reconciliation of family and professional life for men and women. This approach has been used 
successfully to clarify and strengthen parental rights through its ability to apply teleological 
reasoning which goes beyond the black letter and enables consideration of contextual factors and 
overriding objectives. The Court took a similar approach in Roca Álvarez,9 in which it held that leave 
available to fathers could not be restricted to cases where the mother was employed, thus 
precluding Mr. Roca Álvarez, whose partner was self-employed. The Court used the same language 
and reasoning in both cases, cautioning against perpetuation of the “traditional distribution of the 
roles of men and women by keeping men in a role subsidiary to that of women in relation to the 
exercise of their parental duties.”10  
The reference to men’s subordination to women in the context of caregiving is particularly welcome. 
By acknowledging that parental care is a duty, the court imbues it with value, elevating it above its 
currently ascribed low status below paid work. However, though perhaps indicative of a welcome 
shift in the Court’s attitude to gender relations and caregiving, this approach is by no means 
ensured. This uncertainty is illustrated by Montull,11 also heard by the fourth chamber, in which the 
Court held that a national rule denying the transfer of maternity benefit to an employed father 
whose partner was self-employed did not contravene the principle of equal treatment or the 
provisions of Directive 92/85.12 In its judgment, the Court focused on protection of a “‘woman’s 
biological condition during and after pregnancy”13 and of “the special relationship between a woman 
and her child over the period which follows childbirth,”14 a stance reminiscent of an earlier era in the 
Court’s jurisprudence.15  
                                                          
6 Judgment, para 47. 
7 Ibid., para 49. 
8 The article provides for the use of positive action as a way to “ensuring full equality in practice between men 
and women in working life.” Judgment, para 50. 
9 Case No. C-104/09 Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA [2010] ECR I-8661. 
10 Judgment in Roca Álvarez, para 36. 
11 Case No. C-5/12, Betriu Montull v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS), judgment 19 September 
2013, nyr. 
12 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth 
or are breastfeeding OJ L 348/01.  
13 Judgment in Montull, para 50. 
14 Ibid., para 62. 
15 See, for example, Case No. C-163/83 Commission v Italy [1983] ECR 3273; Case No. C-184/83 Hoffman v 
Bermer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 3047; Case No. C-207/98 Mahlburg Lan Mecklenborg-Vorpomenn [2000] ECR I-
549).  
The judgments in Roca Álvarez and Maïstrellis presumably benefited from the clear and progressive 
stance taken by Advocate General Kokott in her opinions, which the Court followed in both cases. 
However, it would be simplistic to conclude that that was what made the difference. In his opinion in 
Montull, which the Court did not follow, Advocate General Wathelet deemed the case 
indistinguishable from Roca Álvarez, concluding that the principle of sex discrimination had been 
infringed upon because the denial of leave to the fathers in both cases amounted to direct sexual 
discrimination.  
The key to understanding the different approaches the Court took in these cases seems to lie in the 
nature of the provisions in question: Roca Álvarez and Maïstrellis are concerned with provision of 
parental leave, albeit paid in Maïstrellis, whereas Montull is primarily concerned with payment of 
maternity benefit. That Article 33(2) CFR was referred to in the first two cases but not in the last is 
perhaps not particularly surprising in light of the article’s careful wording, which specifies “paid 
maternity leave” but is silent on the issue of payment for parental leave. It would thus appear that 
although the court is willing to encourage sharing or transfer of leave or time away from work 
between parents, it is less open to the transfer of what are intended to be maternity-related 
payments to fathers. Had the mother of Mr. Montull’s baby been employed, her entitlement to 
maternity leave (and related benefit) following the compulsory period of six weeks prescribed by 
Directive 92/85 could, with her consent, have been transferred to Mr. Montull. This highlights the 
fragility of derived rights, which are available to fathers only in certain restricted circumstances 
dependent on the mother’s employment status. In justifying such a distinction, the court returns to 
its dominant ideology of motherhood invoking biological difference and the need for “special 
protection” following pregnancy and childbirth.16 
Implications of the Judgment for EU Equality Law 
The court’s judgment in Maïstrellis has led to speculation regarding the sustainability of national 
schemes, such as that recently introduced in the United Kingdom (UK), which enable the transfer of 
a certain proportion of the maternity leave available under domestic provision to the birth father or 
the mother’s partner. On the face of it, the Greek legislation precluded by EU law looks similar to the 
UK’s shared parental leave (SPL) scheme. Although SPL requires that any parent who wishes to 
participate must show that they have a partner who is in some form of employment, an employed 
mother whose partner does not work will have an alternative right to take statutory maternity leave 
of the same length as SPL, whereas a father whose partner does not work will not be entitled to a 
comparable period of paternity leave. The resulting inequality of treatment results largely from EU 
law’s emphasis on women’s need for protection during and following pregnancy. That such provision 
should rely on the mother’s economic activity prior to the birth emphasizes the importance placed 
on the allocation of resources rather than any commitment to provide a fundamental right to 
protection for all mothers and the allocation of leave for all fathers. The approach adopted by the 
UK and similar national schemes is in line with that taken by the Court in Montull and does at least 
enable (some) men the opportunity to participate in parental care. Furthermore, unlike Greece, the 
UK offers the minimum three months’ unpaid parental leave provided for by Directive 96/34 on 
equal terms to either parent making it compatible with Article 33(2) CFR.  
Although the Court’s judgment in Maïstrellis is to be welcomed, not least for its confirmation of the 
approach taken in Roca Álvarez, the provision of parental leave for all fathers and mothers across 
the EU is far from ensured. The inequality of treatment that continues through deriving fathers’ 
                                                          
16 C. McGlynn, “Ideologies of Motherhood in European Community Sex Equality Law,” European Law Journal 6 
(2000): 1, 29. 
rights to pay entitlement and related benefits from those directly applicable to mothers is a 
substantial barrier to reconciling the private and professional lives of Europe’s citizens. Although the 
Court’s recent jurisprudence does recognize fathers’ parental duties, the lack of financial 
compensation for many men seeking leave for family reasons and a continued emphasis on the 
“special relationship” between mother and child means that the EU parental rights’ regime remains 
fragile and divisive. A shift in this approach on the basis that it perpetuates gender inequality by 
reaffirming stereotypes would require an explicit commitment to the social value of parenthood and 
its separation from the distinct state of pregnancy.17     
                                                          
17 S. Fredman ‘Reversing Roles: Bringing Men into the Frame’ International Journal of Law in Context 10 (2014) 
4, 442, at 442. 
